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Abstract 
This study examines: i) cost efficiency and its components (technological progress and scale 
economy); ii) the effects of revenue diversification on cost efficiency, insolvency risk and 
capital ratio, and iii) the management behaviour in Vietnamese banks from 1995 to 2011. 
Using Stochastic Frontier Analysis, this study finds that cost efficiency experienced a slightly 
upward trend over the analysis period. Technological progress overall reduces the costs of 
Vietnamese banks while scale expansion raises their costs. Using a managerial behaviour 
model, which is a system of three simultaneous equations with cost efficiency, insolvency 
risk and capital ratio being dependent variables, this study finds that revenue diversification 
has no significant impact on insolvency risk and capital ratio, but decreases the cost 
efficiency of Vietnamese banks. This study also finds that a decline in cost efficiency 
temporarily precedes a rise in insolvency risk, implying “bad management” behaviour; an 
increase in risk temporarily results in a reduction in cost efficiency, documenting “bad luck” 
behaviour; and a reduction in capital ratio in the poorly capitalized banks temporarily leads to 
a growth in risk, implying “moral hazard” behaviour. The findings are robust to efficiency 
estimation technique (Data Envelopment Analysis) and risk measurement. 
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1. Introduction 
During the last two decades, banks have responded to the deregulation and liberalization by 
applying technological advances to broaden products offered to their clients. The new 
products aim to increase the share of non-interest income in profits mainly through 
diversifying non-lending activities. Existing studies investigating the benefits of revenue 
diversification in improving bank performance and reducing bank insolvency risk  cover the 
US (DeYoung & Rice 2004; Stiroh 2006; Goddard et al. 2008; Elyasiani & Wang 2012), the 
EU (Mercieca et al. 2007; Chiorazzo et al. 2008; Lepetit et al. 2008; Rossi et al. 2009) and 
Asia (Lee et al. (2014) for 22 Asian countries and Meslier et al. (2014) for the Philippines). 
Collectively, these studies highlight the importance of revenue diversification to the banking 
literature. However, the question of whether a greater revenue diversification improves bank 
performance or reduces risk is still a puzzle as these studies document mixed evidence on the 
benefits of revenue diversification.  
 
The reasons behind this puzzle are probably the characteristics of non-interest income 
diversities, the size of non-interest income, competitive environment, industry concentration, 
and a country’s financial/economic performance. Non-interest income stems not only from 
fee-based or commission-based services, such as trade services, guarantees, e-banking 
services and cash and property management, but also from investment banking and market 
trading, such as derivatives for foreign currency, insurance underwriting and security 
investments. The former non-interest source (fee/commission-based services) is known to be 
less influenced by external shocks, but clients tend to switch to another bank with better 
service quality, especially when competition is intense (DeYoung & Roland 2001), while the 
latter non-interest source implies higher risk, but with a greater expected return.  
 
Moreover, most of these studies focus on examining the impact of revenue diversification on 
either bank performance (e.g. Chiorazzo et al. (2008), Elyasiani and Wang (2012), Meslier et 
al. (2014) Elsas et al. (2010)) or risk (e.g. Lepetit et al. (2008)) using separate linear 
regressions. Rossi et al. (2009) are, to the best of our knowledge, pioneers in simultaneously 
investigating the effects of diversification on bank efficiency, risk and capital for Austrian 
banks using a managerial model which is a system of three simultaneous equations with 
efficiency, risk and capital being dependent variables. These authors explained the impact of 
diversification by proposing some hypotheses, namely “classical diversification” (i.e. 
negative impact of diversification on ex-post risk), “lack of expertise” (i.e. positive impact of 
3 
 
diversification on ex-post risk), “idiosyncratic risk” (i.e. positive impact of diversification on 
cost efficiency), “monitoring” (i.e. negative impact of diversification on cost efficiency) and 
“economic capital” (i.e. negative impact of diversification on capital ratio). Moreover, the 
managerial model enables the authors to identify the managerial behaviours of Austrian 
banks based on the managerial framework proposed by Berger and DeYoung (1997), namely 
“bad management” (i.e. a decline in cost efficiency temporarily precedes an increase in risk),  
“bad luck” (i.e. an increase in risk temporarily precedes a decrease in cost efficiency),  
“skimping” (an increase in cost efficiency temporarily precedes an increase in risk) and 
“moral hazard” (a decline in capital ratio temporarily precedes a growth in risk in thinly 
capitalized banks). Several studies identified management behaviours of banks in the EU 
(Williams 2004; Altunbas et al. 2007; Rossi et al. 2009; Fiordelisi et al. 2011), of banks in 
US (Berger & DeYoung 1997; Kwan & Eisenbeis 1997), and of banks in Asia (Tan and 
Floros (2013) for Chinese banks, Deelchand and Padgett (2010) for Japanese banks and 
Reddy (2011) for Indian banks). However, the identified managerial behaviour in financial 
institutions in the literature varied from one country to another. 
 
Inspired by Rossi et al. (2009), this study simultaneously examines the benefits of revenue 
diversification in enhancing efficiency and reducing risk and identifies the management 
behaviour in the context of Vietnamese banks using the managerial model. The benefits of 
revenue diversification and management behaviour have been extensively examined for 
advanced as well as emerging countries. Their findings, however, may not apply to the 
Vietnamese banking market since it has specific characteristics that differ from industrialized 
and other emerging countries. Research on Vietnamese banks is sparse, but very important, 
because of the rapid expansion of this banking system1, declined state-owned banks’ 
domination over the banking market2, adoption of international standards in banking 
supervision and regulations (i.e. capital adequacy, loan classification and loan loss provision) 
as a member of ASEAN (Williams & Nguyen 2005; Nguyen et al. 2012), and the gradual 
integration to the global financial market (e.g. relaxing restrictions on foreign banks’ entry,  
activities and opening branches as committed when signing the US-Vietnam Bilateral Trade 
Agreement in 2000 and joining the World Trade Organization in 2006). Such deregulating 
pressures may encourage Vietnamese banks to employ revenue diversification strategies to 
                                               
1 The Vietnamese banking system increased its total assets from 18% in 1996 to 117% in 2011 (as a percentage 
of GDP) (World databank) 
2 Deposit share of state owned-banks declined from approximately 78% in 2000 to 40% in 2010 (Nguyen et al. 
2014) 
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maintain and develop their customer base. Unlike Rossi et al. (2009) who concentrate on loan 
diversification and uses the Granger-causality to estimate the managerial model, this study 
focuses on revenue diversification and employs the three-stage least square estimator to 
estimate the managerial model; it also investigates if technological progress and scale 
economy exist in Vietnamese banks.  
 
This study augments the existing literature in the following three ways. Firstly, this is the first 
study using the Vietnamese banking data to test hypotheses on the benefits of revenue 
diversification in increasing bank efficiency and decreasing bank insolvency risk. Secondly, 
this is also the first study identifying the management behaviours of banks in Vietnam. 
Secondly, this study also tests the sensitivity of the results using alternative risk measure (i.e. 
volatility of return of equity (ROE)) or an alternative efficiency estimation technique (i.e. 
Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA)). The findings of this study are significant for policy 
makers and managers in initiating policies as well as strategies to improve bank efficiency 
and stability not only in Vietnam, but also in countries with similar degree of revenue 
diversification. 
 
The rest of this study is organized as follows. Section 2 provides research hypotheses on 
diversification and management behaviour and section 3 presents the related literature. 
Section 4 discusses research methodology and data. Section 5 analyses empirical results and 
section 6 draws conclusions and addresses policy implications. 
 
2. Research hypotheses  
Hypotheses on diversification 
Five revenue diversification hypotheses developed by Rossi et al. (2009) are summarized to 
explain the effects of revenue diversification on risk, efficiency and capital, namely “classical 
diversification”, “lack of expertise”, “monitoring”, “idiosyncratic risk” and “economic 
capital” as follows: 
 
Bank revenue consists of interest revenue and non-interest revenue. Interest revenue is the 
interest earned on loans while non-interest revenue is revenue earned mainly from fee-based 
or commission-based services, such as trade services, guarantees, e-banking services and cash 
and property management, and investment banking and market trading, such as derivatives 
for foreign currency, insurance underwriting and security investments. In commercial banks, 
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revenue is usually driven by interest revenue as lending is their traditional activity, so greater 
revenue diversification generally indicates greater shifting of revenue away from interest 
revenue. The “classical diversification” hypothesis assumes that an increase in revenue 
diversification is temporarily associated with a decrease in the ex-post risk of failure. This is 
possibly because non-interest income may be less dependent on overall business conditions 
than traditional interest income, so that an increase in non-interest income reduces the 
cyclical variation in bank profits and revenue (Stiroh 2004).  
 
Nonetheless, an increase in revenue diversification per se does not always reduce the ex-post 
risk of failure or improve the performance. This conflicting prediction in theory has been 
proven by the contradictory empirical evidence of the benefits of revenue diversification. 
Non-interest income from fee-based or commission-based services is less dependent on 
external shocks, but it is expensive to attract and difficult to retain customers for these 
banking services because they can easily switch to online providers (Srinivasan et al. 2002). 
Banks which lack expertise in developing these innovative banking services face difficulties 
in retaining their customers for these services. Hence, this non-interest income may fluctuate 
in a fiercely competitive environment, leading to a high variation in bank revenue and profits. 
Accordingly, higher revenue diversification may temporarily lead to a growth in insolvency 
risk (the “lack of expertise” hypothesis).   
 
The “monitoring” hypothesis indicates that generating non-interest income sources may 
temporarily dampen cost efficiency. This hypothesis is motivated by the fact that developing 
non-lending products requires considerable investments in banking technology and 
professionals in the first stage. Moreover, the success of fee and commission-generating 
banking services highly depends on customer acceptance and satisfaction (Wong & Tong 
2013). To be able to achieve an improvement in these non-interest revenue sources, banks 
may need to implement a comprehensive monitor of these non-lending banking services in 
order to ensure the safety of these services and then build the trust of customers in these 
banking services. 
 
The “idiosyncratic risk” hypothesis, on the other hand, suggests that higher revenue 
diversification may temporarily precede an improvement in cost efficiency. One possible 
explanation is that shifting revenue to non-interest revenue may reduce the lending volume, 
and then reduce idiosyncratic risk, which may permit banks to loosen the monitoring efforts 
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and then lower operating costs. Moreover, e-banking services enable customers to request 
information and carry out their banking transactions via telecommunication network or 
internet without physically visiting a bank branch, which may result in a reduction of 
administrative, operational and personnel costs.  
 
The “economic capital” hypothesis implies that banks with greater revenue operate with a 
smaller capital ratio (measured by ratio of capital to total assets). If noninterest income 
lowers the volatility of bank profits and then reduces insolvency risk, for example, it might be 
reasonable to reduce capital requirements for banks with a diversified revenue portfolio. 
Also, many fee-based activities can be performed holding little or no regulatory capital. 
 
Hypotheses on managerial behaviour 
Four managerial hypotheses, proposed by Berger and DeYoung (1997), are summarized to 
explain the interrelationships between risk, capital and efficiency, namely “bad 
management”, “bad luck”, “skimping” and “moral hazard” as follows: 
 
The “bad luck” hypothesis assumes that an increase in bank risk temporarily precedes a 
decline in cost efficiency. This hypothesis is motivated by the fact that external shocks, such 
as an economic downturn, global or regional financial crisis, real estate price fluctuation, 
precipitate an increase in loan loss and investment loss (Kho & Stulz 2000; Sheng 2009; 
Koetter & Poghosyan 2010; Helleiner 2011). To reduce or recover the loss, banks have to put 
additional managerial effort and expenses to monitor the delinquent borrowers and their 
collateral; to analyse and negotiate the possibility of retrieving the default amount; to seize, 
maintain, and eventually dispose of collateral in case of default; to defend the bank's safety 
and soundness record to bank supervisors and market participants; and maintain higher 
reserves for problem loans and negative investment portfolios as required by bank 
supervisors. These extra costs associated with loan workout and default consequently lower 
cost efficiency. 
 
The “bad management” hypothesis has the opposite temporal ordering from that predicted by 
the bad luck hypothesis (i.e. a decline in cost efficiency temporarily precedes a rise in bank 
risk). Bad management tends to fail to keep costs under control, resulting in low cost 
efficiency. Also, such management tends to adopt poor credit scoring, collateral appraisal, 
loan monitoring practices and analysing investment projects, leading to the approval of a 
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relatively high proportion of loans and investments with low or negative net present values. 
Therefore, apart from an immediate reduction in cost efficiency, badly managed banks may 
have poor quality of earning assets and then a high variability of profitability (i.e. an increase 
in insolvency risk). 
 
The “skimping” hypothesis has the same temporal ordering as the bad management 
hypothesis, but has the opposite sign (i.e. an increase in cost efficiency temporarily precedes 
an increase in risk). Banks with skimping behaviour tend to face the trade-off between short-
term operating costs and poor earning asset quality. To maximize their profits, such banks 
tend to reduce the amount of resources on credit and investment screening and monitoring 
(i.e. fewer expenses), resulting in an improvement of cost efficiency. However, skimping in 
underwriting and monitoring tends to lead to a deterioration in the quality of earning assets, 
then a deviation in profitability (i.e. a growth in insolvency risk). 
 
The “moral hazard” hypothesis predicts that a decline in the capital ratio of thinly capitalized 
banks occurs before a growth in risk. Since the expected return tends to be positively related 
to the risk-taking, i.e. managers in low capitalized banks tend to think that the risk would be 
rewarded, they tend to respond to moral-hazard incentives by taking risky loan and 
investment portfolios. Moreover, the owners of poorly capitalized banks may be less active in 
monitoring the risk-taking activities of the management. Consequently, a decline in 
capitalisation in poorly capitalized banks tends to fuel bank instability.  
 
Overall, the above hypotheses on diversification and managerial behaviour can be 
summarized in Table 1 based on the predicted outcomes for the benefits of revenue 
diversification and the interrelationships between efficiency, risk and capital as follows: 
 
Table 1: Summary of hypotheses on diversification and managerial behaviour 
Hypothesis Independent variable Dependent variable Expected sign 
"Classical diversification" hypothesis Revenue diversification Insolvency Risk Negative 
"Lack of expertise" hypothesis Revenue diversification Insolvency Risk Positive 
"Monitoring" hypothesis Revenue diversification Cost efficiency Negative 
"Idiosyncratic risk" hypothesis Revenue diversification Cost efficiency Positive 
"Economic capital" hypothesis Revenue diversification Capital  ratio Negative 
"Bad luck" hypothesis Insolvency risk Cost efficiency Negative 
"Bad management" hypothesis Cost efficiency Insolvency risk Negative 
"Skimping" hypothesis Cost efficiency Insolvency risk Positive 
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"Moral hazard" hypothesis Capital ratio Insolvency risk Negative 
 
 
3. Brief literature review 
This section starts with a review of the literature on the effects of diversification on risk, 
capital and efficiency, and then moves on to the interrelationships between these three 
variables. 
 
Existing studies investigating the benefits of revenue diversification in improving bank 
performance and reducing insolvency risk cover the US (DeYoung & Rice 2004; Stiroh 
2006; Goddard et al. 2008; Elyasiani & Wang 2012), the EU (Mercieca et al. 2007; 
Chiorazzo et al. 2008; Lepetit et al. 2008; Rossi et al. 2009) and Asia (Lee et al. (2014) for 
22 Asian countries and Meslier et al. (2014) for the Philippines). For instance, in the case of 
755 small European banks, Mercieca et al. (2007) found that revenue diversification reduced 
profitability but also increased risks, which is consistent with the finding of Lepetit et al. 
(2008) that European banks expanding into non-interest income activities were exposed to 
higher levels of insolvency risk. Chiorazzo et al. (2008) found that revenue diversification 
increased the overall profitability of Italian banks, with greater benefits for larger banks. 
Elsas et al. (2010) documented the benefits of diversification with respect to profitability and 
market valuations of banks across nine countries - Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, 
the UK, the US, Spain, and Switzerland.  
 
In the case of US financial institutions, Stiroh (2006) highlighted that the pervasive shift 
toward noninterest income did not significantly improve the risk and return outcomes of these 
banks, which is in line with the finding of Elyasiani and Wang (2012) that no evidence of the 
benefits of revenue diversification in increasing technical efficiency and/or total factor 
productivity was documented for a sample of US bank holding companies. In contrast, 
Goddard et al. (2008) found that a greater highly diversified revenue portfolio was associated 
with lower volatility and lower return on equity for credit unions, but the relationship 
between diversification and financial performance was size-dependent as this relationship 
was not apparent when the full sample was split into subsamples using size criteria.  
 
In the case of emerging economies, Lee et al. (2014) examined banks in 22 Asian countries 
and reported that non-interest revenue increased riskiness of banks in high income countries, 
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but reduced riskiness and increased profitability for banks in middle and low income 
countries. Also, non-interest revenue decreased profitability and increased risk for savings 
banks, but the opposite effects occurred for commercial, cooperative, and investment banks. 
Meslier et al. (2014) reported that banks in the Philippines benefited from a shift towards 
non-interest activities in increasing their profitability, and this benefit was greater for foreign 
banks compared to their domestic counterparts.  
 
It can be seen that the banking literature documents contradictory empirical evidence on the 
benefits of revenue diversification, which could be due to the characteristics of non-lending 
income diversities, the size of non-interest income, competitive environment, industry 
concentration, and a country’s financial/economic performance. Moreover, these studies 
employ separate linear regressions to estimate the effects of revenue diversification on either 
bank risk or performance. Rossi et al. (2009) are, to the best of our knowledge, pioneers in 
simultaneously investigating the effects of loan diversification on bank efficiency, risk and 
capital for Austrian banks using a managerial model which is a system of three simultaneous 
equations with efficiency, risk and capital being dependent variables. These authors 
explained the impact of diversification on cost efficiency, risk and capital by proposing five 
hypotheses, namely: “classical diversification” (i.e. negative impact of diversification on ex-
post risk), “lack of expertise” (i.e. positive impact of diversification on ex-post risk), 
“idiosyncratic risk” (i.e. positive impact of diversification on cost efficiency), “monitoring” 
(i.e. negative impact of diversification on cost efficiency) and “economic capital” (i.e. 
negative impact of diversification on capital ratio). The managerial model also enables the 
authors to identify four managerial behaviours for the sample of Austrian banks based on the 
managerial framework proposed by Berger and DeYoung (1997), namely “bad management” 
(i.e. a decline in cost efficiency temporarily precedes an increase in risk), “bad luck” (i.e. an 
increase in risk temporarily precedes a decrease in cost efficiency), “skimping” (an increase 
in cost efficiency temporarily precedes an increase in risk) and “moral hazard” (a decline in 
capital ratio temporarily precedes a growth in risk in thinly capitalized banks). Using a 
Granger-causality approach, these authors confirmed the “monitoring” hypothesis, “classical 
diversification” hypothesis, “bad management” hypothesis and “bad luck” hypothesis for 
Austrian banks. 
 
Several studies have examined the interrelationships between risk, capital and efficiency to 
identify bank management behaviours using the managerial model. However, different 
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management behaviours are identified from one study to another, which is possibly due to the 
difference in the characteristics of banking systems, period of analysis, method employed and 
risk measure. Specifically, Berger and DeYoung (1997) used Granger-causality techniques to 
estimate the interrelationships between nonperforming loans, cost efficiency and capital; they 
found evidence of “bad management”, “bad luck”, “moral hazard” and “skimping” 
behaviours in US banks.  Kwan and Eisenbeis (1997) attempted to identify the management 
behaviours of US bank holding companies by examining the relationships between risk (ratio 
of nonperforming loan to total loans), capitalization and cost efficiency. Using the two-stage 
least-squares (2SLS) estimator, these authors confirmed only the “moral hazard” hypothesis 
that poor performing banks tend to be more vulnerable to risk-taking than high performing 
banks. 
 
Williams (2004) identified the management behaviour of European saving banks between 
1990 and 1998 based on the interrelationships between risk (ratio of loan loss provision to 
loans), cost efficiency and capitalisation. Using the Granger causality estimator, the author 
found “bad management” behaviour in European saving banks and “bad luck” only in 
German banks. Fiordelisi et al. (2011) attempted to identify the management behaviours in 
European commercial banks from 1995 to 2007. Using the same methodology to estimate the 
managerial model but different risk measures (ratio of nonperforming loans to total loans and 
the 5-year ahead cumulative expected default frequency), they found “bad management” 
prevailed across European commercial banks. Altunbas et al. (2007) addressed the same issue 
for a sample of European banks between 1992 and 2000. Using seemly unrelated regressions 
(SUR), they found no significant relationship between efficiency and bank risk-taking (ratio 
of loan loss reserves to total loans).  They also found that there were no major differences in 
the relationships between capital, risk and efficiency for commercial and savings banks 
although some were noted in the case of co-operative banks, with management of these banks 
exhibiting “moral hazard” behaviour. 
 
Several studies also attempt to identify management behaviour of banks in Asia. Deelchand 
and Padgett (2010)  investigated the relationships between risk (ratio of loan loss reserves to 
total assets), capital and cost inefficiency for a sample of Japanese cooperative banks from 
2003 and 2006. Using the 2SLS approach, these authors highlighted the “bad management”, 
“moral hazard” and “bad luck” in these banks. They also found that risky Japanese banks 
held thin capital, and there was a negative relationship between efficiency and capital in these 
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banks. Tan and Floros (2013) assessed the relationship between efficiency, risk (Z-score, 
standard deviation of return on assets (ROA), standard deviation of return on equity (ROE) 
and ratio of loan-loss provision to total loans) and capital in Chinese commercial banks over 
the period 2003-2009. Using the three stage least squares (3SLS) estimator for the managerial 
model, these authors documented evidence of “bad management” in Chinese banks. Also, 
there was a positive and significant relationship between risk and efficiency while there was a 
negative and significant association between risk and capital level. Reddy (2011) detected the 
management behaviour in Indian banks from 1995 to 2007. Using Granger causality to 
estimate the managerial model, the results revealed the existence of the “bad management”, 
“bad luck” and “moral hazard” in Indian bank management. 
 
There are several studies on the performance of Vietnamese banks, including Nguyen et al. 
(2014), Vu and Nahm (2013), Gardener et al. (2011) and Vu and Turnell (2010), but these 
studies focus on estimating the efficiency level and identifying the efficiency determinants of 
Vietnamese banks. Inspired by Rossi et al. (2009), this study employs the managerial model 
to simultaneously investigate the effects of diversification on efficiency, risk and capital and 
identify the management behaviours in the context of Vietnamese banks. However, this study 
focuses on the benefits of revenue diversification and employs the 3SLS approach to estimate 
the managerial model while Rossi et al. (2009) concentrate on the loan diversification and use 
the Granger causality approach for the managerial model. In addition, we attempt to examine 
whether there is the presence of technological progress and scale economy in Vietnamese 
banks. Therefore, our study will extend the current banking literature since this is, to the best 
of our knowledge, the first study looking at three important issues of Vietnamese banks. The 
first is testing the diversification hypotheses based on its impact on risk, efficiency and 
capital. The second is testing the management behaviour hypotheses based on the 
interrelationships between risk, capital and efficiency. The last is the effects of technical 
changes and scale expansion on the costs of Vietnamese banks. 
 
4. Methodology 
4.1. Diversification index 
We measure revenue diversification by following the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) 
approach, since this approach is widely-used in the literature (Hayden et al. 2007; Mercieca 
et al. 2007; Chiorazzo et al. 2008; Goddard et al. 2008; Elsas et al. 2010; Meslier et al. 
2014). In this study, revenue diversification measures a diversity of revenue across two 
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different sources: interest revenue and non-interest revenue. The calculation of the 
diversification index is as follows: 
𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 = 1 −  ∑ (
𝐿𝑖
𝑄⁄ )
2
, 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑄 =
2
𝑖=1
∑ 𝐿𝑖
2
𝑖=1
                 (1) 
 
where 𝐿1 is non-interest revenue; 𝐿2 is interest revenue; and 𝑄 is the sum of 𝐿1  and 𝐿2. The 
diversification index takes values between zero and one, with higher values indicating greater 
diversification. 
 
4.2. Efficiency, scale economy and technological progress 
Efficiency estimation 
Efficiency is widely estimated by either Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA) proposed by 
Aigner et al. (1977) and Meeusen and Van den Broeck (1977) or Data Envelopment Analysis 
(DEA) proposed by Charnes et al. (1978). SFA and DEA are different in the way they deal 
with statistical noise: SFA, which requires econometric estimation, captures statistical noise 
in the error term, while DEA which requires linear programming assumes no statistical noise. 
Since banking data on emerging countries like Vietnam have a possibility of measurement 
error and statistical noise, we select SFA to estimate the efficiency of Vietnamese banks. The 
empirical specification of the cost frontier for the Vietnamese banking system is as follows: 
 
𝐶𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝛽𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡                             (2) 
 
where 𝐶𝑖𝑡 denotes the natural logarithm of total cost for bank i in year t, which is the sum of 
interest expenses, other operating expenses and personnel expenses. 𝑋𝑖𝑡 denote a vector of 
output, input price, and time variables. 𝛼 and 𝛽 are parameters of the cost function which 
capture the unknown technology of the banking system and is estimated by the maximum 
likelihood method. The error term 𝜀𝑖𝑡 comprises of 𝑣𝑖𝑡 and 𝑢𝑖𝑡  (𝜀𝑖𝑡 = 𝑣𝑖𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡). The 
symmetric component 𝑣𝑖𝑡 is the random error term which captures the statistical noise, 
measurement error and exogenous shocks beyond managerial control, and is assumed to have 
a normal distribution. The component 𝑢𝑖𝑡 is the one-sided error term which captures 
inefficiency relative to the frontier, and is assumed to have a truncated-normal distribution 
and to be independent of 𝑣𝑖𝑡. The individual cost efficiency (CE) scores are calculated as 
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𝐶𝐸𝑖𝑡 = exp (𝑢𝑖𝑡). CE will range from 0 (very poorly operated banks) to 1 (best-practice 
banks). 
 
As shown in Equation 2, this study estimates the cost frontier based on the output and input 
prices. Following Fiordelisi et al. (2011), Deelchand and Padgett (2010), Nguyen et al. 
(2014) and Gardener et al. (2011) and many other studies, this study adopts the 
intermediation approach, pioneered by Sealey and Lindley (1977), which assumes that banks 
use three inputs, namely deposits, physical capital and personnel to produce two outputs, 
namely loans (𝑌1) and other earning assets (𝑌2).  Accordingly, this study calculates the price 
of the three inputs, namely financial capital price, physical capital price and labour price, 
which are respectively calculated as ratio of interest expenses to total funding (𝑊1), the ratio 
of other operating expenses to fixed assets (𝑊2) and the ratio of personnel expenses to total 
assets (𝑊3).  
 
This study adopts the transcendental logarithm (translog) functional form since it is the most 
commonly used functional form in the banking efficiency literature. We impose linear 
homogeneity restrictions by normalizing the dependent variable and input price variables by 
the labour price (𝑊3). This study also includes variable time trend (t) to account for 
technological progress over time (t=1 for 1995, t=2 for 1996, .., t=17 for 2011). The translog 
cost SFA model to estimate cost efficiency for the panel data takes the following form 
(subscripts i and t are dropped for ease of viewing): 
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2
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1
2
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2 + ∑ 𝛾2+𝑚
2
𝑚=1
𝑡 ln 𝑌𝑚 +  ∑ 𝛾4+𝑛
2
𝑛=1
𝑡 ln(𝑊𝑛/𝑊3) + 𝑣 + 𝑢     (3) 
 
The efficiency estimation strategy for Equation 3 in empirical part is based on the SFA model 
developed by Battese and Coelli (1995). To have a robust check of the results, efficiency is 
also estimated based on the SFA model proposed by Greene (2005) which accounts for 
unobserved unit-specific heterogeneity. 
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Technological progress 
Following Vu and Turnell (2010), Altunbaş et al. (2001), the rate of technological progress is 
inferred from the changes in firm’s cost function over time. Therefore, the impact of technical 
changes on bank costs is calculated by the change in the average cost corresponding to a 
change in technology. As time trend variable (t) in Equation 3 is a proxy for disembodied 
technical changes, the change in the average cost corresponding to a technical change can be 
measured by cost elasticity (𝐶𝐸𝑆𝑇) with respect to time (t) as follows: 
  
𝐶𝐸𝑆𝑇 =
𝛿 ln 𝑇𝐶
𝛿 ln 𝑡
                          (4) 
Technological progress exists when 𝐶𝐸𝑆𝑇 is negative (i.e., reduces costs over time). 
Technological regress occurs if 𝐶𝐸𝑆𝑇 is positive, while neutral technological change occurs if 
the derivative is equal to zero. 
 
Cost scale economy  
Increasing return to scale occurs when a bank is able to reduce costs per unit of output as it 
expands, everything else constant. Constant and decreasing returns to scale take place when 
the marginal costs remain the same or increase, respectively, as output expands. Mester 
(1996) proposed a measure of within sample economy of scale by cost elasticity. This 
measure has been applied in the studies by Dong et al. (2014), Huang et al. (2010), Vu and 
Turnell (2010), and Altunbaş et al. (2001). Following these studies, this study measures cost 
economy of scale by cost elasticity with respect to all outputs. That is, how banks manage 
changes in costs related to proportional change in their outputs. Cost elasticity (𝐶𝐸𝑆𝑌) is 
calculated by taking the derivatives of the transformed function (Equation 3) with respect to 
all outputs as follows:  
𝐶𝐸𝑆𝑌 = ∑
𝛿 ln 𝑇𝐶
𝛿 ln 𝑌𝑖
2
𝑖=1
                         (5) 
An estimate of 𝐶𝐸𝑆𝑌 less than, equal to, or greater than one respectively indicates increasing, 
constant and decreasing return to scale.  
 
4.3. Managerial behaviour model to test hypotheses on diversification and managerial 
behaviour 
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This study follows Rossi et al. (2009) to employ the managerial behaviour model, which is a 
system of three equations, to simultaneously investigate the effects of diversification on risk, 
efficiency and capital, and identify the management behaviour. Bank risk is primarily 
measured by Z-score, capital is measured by the ratio of total equity to total assets, efficiency 
is evaluated in cost efficiency and model specification is based on the literature; the system of 
three equations is defined as follows: 
 
𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑡              = ∝0 + ∝1 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒 𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 + ∝2 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦𝑖𝑡 +
∝3 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼4 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 + ∝5 𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡 + 𝜔𝑖𝑡   (6) 
𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡        = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒 𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽4 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡      (7) 
𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛾0 + 𝛾1𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒 𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾2𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 + 𝛾3𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡 +
𝛾4𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾5𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡 + 𝜃𝑖𝑡                                      (8) 
 
where all variables are described in Part B of Table 2. Z-score is selected as a risk 
measurement in Vietnamese banks as it has been widely used in the literature, including Tan 
and Floros (2013), Beck et al. (2013), Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (2010), Houston et al. 
(2010) and Laeven and Levine (2009). There are also other measures of risk in the literature, 
such as ratio of loan loss provision to gross loans (Williams 2004; Tan & Floros 2013), ratio 
of loan loss reserves to total assets (Altunbas et al. 2007; Deelchand & Padgett 2010), ratio of 
non-performing loans to gross loans (Berger & DeYoung 1997; Das & Ghosh 2004; 
Fiordelisi et al. 2011), volatility of return on assets (ROA) and volatility of ROE (Lepetit et 
al. 2008; Pennathur et al. 2012; Lee et al. 2014), and 1 or 5-year ahead expected default 
frequency (Fiordelisi et al. 2011). However, the three former measures (ratio of loan loss 
provision to gross loans, ratio of loan loss reserves to total assets, and ratio of non-performing 
loans to gross loans) are subject to managerial discretion and capture only credit risks, while 
non-lending earning assets account for approximately 40% of the outputs of Vietnamese 
banks. Moreover, the latter (1 or 5-year ahead expected default frequency) requires data on 
stock prices while many Vietnamese banks are not listed on the stock exchange. Therefore, 
Z-score is more appropriate for measuring bank risk in Vietnam. As the Z-score is highly 
skewed, this study uses the natural logarithm of the Z-score to reduce the skewness. 
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Equation 6 explores the effects of revenue diversification, efficiency and capital on 
insolvency risk. Specifically, a negative/positive significant parameter ∝1 (i.e. revenue 
diversification increases/decreases bank risk, respectively (note that risk is measured by Z-
score and a higher Z-score implies a lower risk)) supports the “lack of expertise” 
hypothesis/“classical diversification” hypothesis, respectively. A negative/positive significant 
parameter ∝2 (i.e. a decline in cost efficiency temporarily precedes a decline/growth in bank 
risk) confirms the “skimping” hypothesis/“bad management” hypothesis, respectively. A 
positive significant parameter ∝3 for a sample of thinly-capitalized banks (a decline in capital 
ratio occurs before a rise in risk in banks with capital ratio below the median) supports the 
“moral hazard” hypothesis. Equation 7 examines the effects of revenue diversification on 
bank capital. A negative significant parameter 𝛽1 (i.e. banks with greater revenue 
diversification operate with less capital) confirms the “economic capital” hypothesis. 
Equation 8 investigates the impact of revenue diversification and risk on cost efficiency.  
Specifically, a negative/positive significant parameter 𝛾1(i.e. revenue diversification 
decreases/increases bank efficiency, respectively) supports the “monitoring” 
hypothesis/“idiosyncratic risk” hypothesis, respectively. 
 
Several methods were used to estimate the managerial behaviour model: i) Granger-causality 
(Berger & DeYoung 1997; Williams 2004; Rossi et al. 2009; Fiordelisi et al. 2011); ii) SUR 
(Altunbas et al. 2007); iii) 2SLS (Kwan & Eisenbeis 1997; Deelchand & Padgett 2010); and 
iv) 3SLS (Tan & Floros 2013). The Granger causality does not consider the effects of other 
variables and the results are sensitive to model specification and the number of lags. The 
2SLS ignores the correlations of the error terms across the equations while the SUR does not 
address the endogeneity. This study estimates the managerial model (Equations 6-8) by  
3SLS, introduced by Zellner and Theil (1962), which uses instrumental-variables to produce 
consistent estimates and generalized least squares to account for the correlation of residuals 
across equations. Specifically, in the first stage, the reduced form of the model is estimated. 
In the second stage, the fitted values of the endogenous variables are used to estimate 
Equations 6-8 of the managerial model (2SLS). In the third stage, generalised least squares 
parameters are obtained. As risk, capital and efficiency are defined as dependent variables of 
the managerial model (i.e. endogenous variables), other variables, including revenue 
diversification, size, GDP growth, diversification of earning assets, ratio of loans to deposits, 
inflation and economic freedom, are defined as exogenous variables and taken to be 
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instrumental variables for predicting endogenous variables, with the four later variables not 
specified in the system equations. 
 
Vietnamese banks have focused on diversification of their revenue base by developing non-
lending products, such as e-banking services, credit/debit cards and automated teller 
machines (ATMs), and putting investments in stock/bond market in only the last decade, 
since e-banking services was introduced from 2000 (Pham 2010) and the stock market was 
set up in year 2000 (Dung 2010).  Thus, it is a bit early to expect gains from these 
investments, as it takes time and money to popularize these non-lending products to the 
customers as well as to accumulate investing experiences in the Vietnamese stock/bond 
market. That is, a negative impact of revenue diversification on cost efficiency (a negative 𝛾1) 
is expected. Further, since non-interest revenue accounts for only a small proportion in total 
revenue of Vietnamese banks (approximately 11%), a change in non-interest revenue 
proportion may be insufficient to create significant effects on insolvency risk and capital 
ratio. Therefore, the effects of revenue diversification on the insolvency risk and capital ratio 
of Vietnamese banks are expected to be insignificant (∝1 and 𝛽1 are statistically 
insignificant). Moreover, the characteristics of the Vietnamese banking system appear similar 
to the Indian banking system, such as state-owned banks’ dominance3, a moderate presence 
of foreign banks4 and government’s control over the interest rates and credit growth (Reddy 
2011; Nguyen et al. 2014). As the management of Indian banks were found to exhibit “bad 
management”, “bad luck” and “moral hazard” behaviours. Accordingly, it is expected that 
“bad management” (a positive ∝2), “bad luck” (a positive 𝛾2) and “moral hazard” (a positive 
∝3) are characterised in the management of Vietnamese banks.  
 
This study also checks for the robustness of the confirmed hypotheses by using an alternative 
efficiency estimation techniques (DEA), an alternative risk measure (volatility of ROE, 
measured by standard deviation of ROE), and an alternative SFA estimation approach (the 
SFA model proposed by Greene (2005)) (the volatility of ROA is not used as an alternative 
risk measure since it is a component of Z-score). A higher figure of volatility of ROE 
indicates that a bank has greater insolvency risk.  
 
                                               
3 Over the period 2000-2011, the average deposit market share of state-owned banks is approximately 64% in 
Vietnam and 75% in India (author’s calculation based on the annual report of the central bank). 
4 The average deposit market share of foreign banks is approximately 9% in Vietnam and 5.2% in India 
(author’s calculation based on the annual report of the central bank). 
18 
 
4.4. Data  
By the end of 2011, the Vietnamese credit institution system consisted of 5 state-owned 
commercial banks, 37 joint-stock commercial banks, 50 branches of foreign banks, 5 banks 
with 100% foreign capital, 4 joint-venture banks, 30 financial companies/financial leasing 
companies and more than 1000 local people credit funds. However, the Vietnamese 
commercial banking system, including state-owned commercial banks, joint-stock 
commercial banks and joint-venture/foreign banks, accounts for 97% of the credit institution 
market in terms of total assets, of which 40% is taken up by state-owned commercial banks, 
46% is taken up by joint-stock commercial banks and 11% is taken up by joint-
venture/foreign banks5. This study focuses only Vietnamese local commercial banks (i.e. 
state-owned commercial banks and joint-stock commercial banks) as data on joint-
venture/foreign banks cannot be obtained.  
 
More specifically, our data sample consists of 28 local commercial banks from 1995 to 2011, 
including all 5 state-owned commercial banks and 23 main joint-stock commercial banks, 
which represents above 95% of the local banking market in terms of total assets (list of 
sample banks is displayed in the appendix B). This data sample is an unbalanced panel, with 
the total bank-year observations being 356, and is collected from International Bank Credit 
Analysis Ltd (Fitch-IBCA). Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics for all of the variables 
used in this study. Data on outputs 1 and 2 show that lending is the major earning activity in 
Vietnamese local banks, which is supported by the index of diversification (0.19) that the 
revenue of Vietnamese banks is mainly driven by interest revenue.  Data on the remaining 
variables show that Vietnamese banks, on average, have the capital ratio of 11% and the 
annual GDP growth rate is 6.71%. 
 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics of variables 
Variables Descriptions Mean 
A. Variables used for estimating cost efficiency 
TC (Total Cost) The sum of interest expenses, other operating expenses and personnel 
expenses (million $US) 
165.52 
(328.41) 
Y1 (Output 1) Net loans measured by gross loans minus reserves for impaired loans 
(million $US) 
1357.72 
(2696.33) 
Y2 (Output 2) Other earning assets measured by security investments and other earning 
assets (million $US) 
716.44 
(1116.31) 
                                               
5 Source: annual report of the central bank of Vietnam in 2011 
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W1(Price of input 1)  Financial capital price calculated by the ratio of interest expenses to total 
funding 
0.06 
(0.026) 
W2(Price of input 2) Physical capital price computed by the ratio of other operating expenses to 
fixed assets 
1.00 
(0.792) 
W3 (Price of input 3) Labour price which is proxied by the ratio of personnel expenses to total 
assets 
0.01 
(0.003) 
t Time trend which equals 1 for year 1995, 2 for year 1996 … and 17 for 
year 2011 
10.39 
(4.624) 
B. Variables used for testing hypotheses on diversification and managerial behaviour 
Revenue diversification A measure of diversification of revenue across two different sources: 
interest revenue and non-interest revenue  
0.19 
(0.108) 
Risk (Ln (Z-score)) A risk measurement which is computed by the ratio of ROA plus the 
capital ratio divided by the standard deviation of ROA 
3.57 
(0.34) 
Risk (Volatility of ROE) A risk measurement which is calculated by standard deviation of ROE 0.16 
(0.40) 
Capital The capital ratio measured by the ratio of equity to total assets 0.11 
(0.079) 
Size A natural logarithm of total assets which captures bank size 6.51 
(1.706) 
GDP Growth 
  
The GDP growth rate (annual %) 6.71 
(1.079) 
Data on bank-specific variables are from FITCH-IBCA; Data on inflation are from World bank database; 
Standard deviation in parentheses. 
 
 
5. Empirical results 
5.1. Efficiency, technological progress and scale economy 
Efficiency analysis 
Parameter estimates based on the cost stochastic frontier model (Eq. 3) developed by Battese 
and Coelli (1995) are presented in Table 3. The statistical significance of the γ (ratio of 
standard deviation of inefficiency to that of random noise, known as the signal to noise ratio) 
and σu (standard deviation of inefficiency) indicates the significant presence of cost 
inefficiency. The signal-to-noise ratio (γ) is 16.92, suggesting that the variability of costs of 
Vietnamese banks is 16.92 times more likely due to the variability of inefficiency than the 
variability of random noise. Parameters for bank outputs (lny1 and lny2) are statistically 
significant and positive, indicating that loans and non-lending earning assets are positively 
associated with costs. Parameter for ratio of financial capital price to labour price (lnw1/w3) is 
statistically significant in quadratic term and parameter for ratio of physical capital price to 
labour price (lnw2/w3) is statistically significant. Parameter time trend (t) is statistically 
positive, suggesting that Vietnamese banks increased costs during the analysis period. It 
20 
 
should be noted that the magnitude of parameters of bank outputs, input prices and time trend 
do not capture the full effects of bank outputs, inputs prices and technological progress on 
total cost of Vietnamese banks as one needs to take into account parameters of their quadratic 
term and interaction terms. However, all the output, input price and time trend variables have 
significant impact on total cost of Vietnamese banks, implying that the cost function for 
Vietnamese banks is reasonable. 
  
Table 3: Cost function (SFA estimates) 
 
Variables 
  Cost function 
  Coef. Std. Err. 
Constant 
 
1.9514*** (0.2790) 
Log of net loan  (lny1) 
 
0.5439*** (0.0715) 
Log of other earning asset (lny2) 
 
0.4619*** (0.0586) 
Log of price ratio of financial capital/ labour (lnw1/w3) 
 
0.2089* (0.1075) 
Log of price ratio of physical capital /labour (lnw2/w3) 
 
0.0778 (0.0775) 
Time trend (t) 
 
-0.0361*** (0.0118) 
(lny1)2 
 
0.1522*** (0.0170) 
lny1*lny2 
 
-0.1638*** (0.0118) 
lny1*lnw1/w3 
 
-0.0078 (0.0210) 
lny1*lnw2/w3 
 
-0.0003 (0.0127) 
lny1*t 
 
0.0093*** (0.0022) 
(lny2)2 
 
0.1598*** (0.0090) 
lny2*lnw1/w3 
 
0.0301 (0.0203) 
lny2*lnw2/w3 
 
0.0021 (0.0105) 
lny2*t 
 
-0.0057** (0.0022) 
(lnw1/w3)2 
 
0.2461*** (0.0403) 
lnw1/w3*lnw2/w3 
 
-0.0428* (0.0238) 
lnw1/w3*t 
 
0.0090** (0.0036) 
(lnw2/w3)2 
 
0.0048 (0.0155) 
lnw2/w3*t 
 
0.0010 (0.0021) 
t2 
 
-0.0019*** (0.0006) 
σu 
 
1.1260*** (0.3071) 
γ (σu/ σv)   16.9170*** (0.3075) 
***, ** and *: 1%, 5% and 10% levels of significance, respectively 
 
Standard errors in parentheses 
   
 
 
Once efficiency scores of individual banks in individual years are obtained, the average 
efficiency score for the whole banking system in each year is calculated by averaging the 
efficiency scores of all banks in each year, and the average efficiency score for the whole 
banking system in the study period is calculated by averaging the efficiency scores of all 
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years in the analysis period. Figure 1 displays cost efficiency of the Vietnamese banking 
system over the period 1995-2011. It can be seen that the period-averaged cost efficiency of 
the Vietnamese banking system is 0.916, suggesting that Vietnamese banks could reduce 
8.4% of their operating costs while producing the same outputs. Adding the trend line to 
Figure 1, it can be seen that cost efficiency experiences a slightly upward trend over the 
period 1995-2011, which is consistent with the finding of Nguyen et al. (2014) on 
Vietnamese banks. Furthermore, cost efficiency declined in the periods 1996-1999 and 2008-
2011, which could be due to the effects of the 1997-1998 Asian financial crisis and 2007-
2008 global financial crisis (e.g. loan losses increase). 
 
 
 
Technological progress 
 
 
The impact of technological progress on bank costs, inferred from cost elasticity with respect 
to time t (𝐶𝐸𝑆𝑇), captures not only the impact of production innovations, but also the 
deregulation and other factors such as changes in organizational structure and processes, on 
bank costs. Figure 2 shows cost elasticity with respect to time (𝐶𝐸𝑆𝑇) over the period 1995-
2011. The positive 𝐶𝐸𝑆𝑇 before 2000 and negative 𝐶𝐸𝑆𝑇 after 2000 indicate that 
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technological progress increased bank costs at a diminishing rate for the period 1995-2000 
(i.e. technological regress occurs), but decreased bank costs at an increasing rate for the 
remaining analysis period (i.e. technological progress occurs). The increased competition 
brought about by the gradual deregulating process plus the new technologies, such as 
computerization and adoption of more streamlined business practices allowed Vietnamese 
banks to lower their costs. The 𝐶𝐸𝑆𝑇 is -0.005, suggesting that Vietnamese banks benefited 
from technological progress in reducing their total cost by 0.5% per year. 
 
Economies of scale 
 
 
Figure 3 indicates that cost elasticity with respect to all output variables (𝐶𝐸𝑆𝑌) experienced 
an upward trend, with the value being slightly above one in each year of the period 1995-
2011. This suggests that scale expansion increased the costs of Vietnamese banks at an 
increasing rate over the period 1995-2011 (i.e. decreasing return to scale or diseconomies of 
scale). The period-averaged cost elasticity with respect to all output variables (y1 and y2) of 
Vietnamese banks is 1.014, implying that a 1% increase in the level of all outputs, on 
average, would lead to about 1.014% increase in total costs. 
 
To have a robust check of the results on the efficiency level, efficiency trend, technological 
progress and scale economy, Equation 3 is also estimated based the SFA model proposed by 
Greene (2005) which accounts for unobserved unit-specific heterogeneity. The results 
obtained based on the model specification of Greene (2005) is displayed in Table C.1 and 
Figures C.1-C.3 in Appendix C. It can be seen that the results are similar to those obtained 
based on the model specification of Battese and Coelli (1995) except that decreasing return to 
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scale (𝐶𝐸𝑆𝑌 = 1.014) is documented when applying SFA model of  Battese and Coelli 
(1995) while increasing return to scale (𝐶𝐸𝑆𝑌 = 0.998) is documented when applying SFA 
model of Greene (2005), but the difference in costs generated when expanding 1% level of 
outputs between the two model specifications (i.e. the difference in 𝐶𝐸𝑆𝑌) is tiny.  
 
 
5.2. Tests for hypotheses on diversification managerial behaviour 
As this study selects Z-score as a primary risk measurement and SFA as a primary technique 
for estimating cost efficiency, this study focuses on discussing the 3SLS estimates with risk 
measured by Z-score and efficiency estimated by SFA (Column 1 of Table 4). The Chi-
squared values obtained from the 3SLS estimator indicate that the system of three 
simultaneous equations  is significant. 
 
Results for Equation 5 show that revenue diversification (𝛼1) is statistically unrelated to 
insolvency risk as expected. One possible explanation is that in Vietnamese banks, non-
interest revenue accounts for only approximately 11% of the total revenue; thereby a change 
in non-interest revenue share may be insufficient to create significant effects on insolvency 
risk. Cost efficiency (𝛼2)  is found to be significantly and positively associated with Z-score. 
That is a decline in cost efficiency temporarily preceding an increase in insolvency risk, 
thereby supporting the “bad management” hypothesis and rejecting the “skimping” 
hypothesis. Capital ratio (𝛼3) is found to have a significant and positive effect on Z-score. 
This means a decline in capital temporarily leading to a rise in insolvency risk, providing 
evidence of supporting the “moral hazard” hypothesis. Larger banks (𝛼4) are found to have 
lower insolvency risk, which could be because larger banks may have better experience in 
screening and monitoring loan and investment portfolios. GDP growth rate (𝛼5) is found to 
be statistically unrelated to bank risk. 
 
Regarding Equation 7, revenue diversification (𝛽1) is found to be statistically unrelated to 
capital ratio as expected. Cost efficiency (𝛽2) is found to have significant and negative 
impact on the capital ratio of Vietnamese banks. Banks often respond to deterioration in cost 
efficiency by raising capital (numerator of capital ratio) as a precautionary step. Z-score (𝛽3) 
is found to have a significant and positive effect on capital ratio. Although risk management 
ability has significantly improved over time, banks still have to allocate loans to inefficient 
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state-owned enterprises as the Vietnamese government still has influence on the banks’ 
operations, especially the credit allocation. These loans have lower probability of repayment 
while capital works as a cushion to absorb these losses, leading to the fact that an increase in 
insolvency risk leads to a decline in capital ratio. Larger bank (𝛽4) is found to operate with a 
lower capital ratio, which could be because the raising of capital (numerator of capital ratio) 
is lower than the expansion of total assets (denominator of capital ratio). GDP growth rate 
(𝛽5) is found to be statistically unrelated to capital ratio. 
 
Results for Equation 8 indicate that revenue diversification (𝛾1) is significantly and inversely 
associated with cost efficiency as expected. This finding provides evidence to support the 
“monitoring” hypothesis, which is consistent with the finding by Rossi et al. (2009) when 
they investigated the effects of loan diversification on the cost efficiency of Austrian banks. 
Z-score (𝛾2) is found to have a significant and positive effect on cost efficiency. That is a rise 
in insolvency risk temporarily preceding a reduction in cost efficiency, providing evidence to 
confirm the “bad luck” hypothesis. Banks which raise equity as a funding source for loans 
usually involve higher costs, therefore an increase in capital ratio (𝛾3) is found to temporarily 
precede a decrease in cost efficiency. Bank size (𝛾4) and GDP growth rate (𝛾5) are found to 
be unrelated to cost efficiency.  
 
Table 4: Tests for hypotheses on diversification and managerial behaviour 
Risk measurement Risk = Z-score   Risk = minus ROE Volatility   Risk = Z-score 
Efficiency estimation technique SFA efficiency 
 
SFA efficiency 
 
DEA efficiency 
Column (1)   (2)   (3) 
Dependent variable is Risk (Eq. 6) 
Revenue Diversification (𝛼1) 0.1691 (0.1695) 
 
1.3948*** (0.4144) 
 
0.3749* (0.2007) 
Efficiency (𝛼2) 2.4188*** (0.6640) 
 
8.2505*** (0.4959) 
 
2.0295*** (0.5344) 
Capital (𝛼3) 4.7486*** (0.9029) 
 
9.1527*** (1.6381) 
 
3.2670** (1.3089) 
Size (𝛼4) 0.0577** (0.0248) 
 
0.0967* (0.0507) 
 
0.0003 (0.0378) 
GDP growth (𝛼5) 0.0030 (0.0154) 
 
-0.0267 (0.0418) 
 
-0.0186 (0.0182) 
Constant 0.4172 (0.6793) 
 
-9.4327*** (0.6935) 
 
1.4149*** (0.4996) 
Dependent variable is Capital (Eq. 7) 
Revenue Diversification (𝛽1) -0.0375 (0.0356) 
 
-0.1505*** (0.0504) 
 
-0.0284 (0.0564) 
Efficiency (𝛽2) -0.5161*** (0.1343) 
 
-0.8869*** (0.1874) 
 
-0.1806 (0.2264) 
Risk (𝛽3) 0.2069*** (0.0382) 
 
0.1078*** (0.0193) 
 
0.1924** (0.0759) 
Size (𝛽4) -0.0123*** (0.0030) 
 
-0.0108*** (0.0041) 
 
-0.0126* (0.0071) 
GDP growth (𝛽5) -0.0006 (0.0031) 
 
0.0028 (0.0047) 
 
-0.0010 (0.0045) 
Constant -0.0671 (0.1887) 
 
1.0188*** (0.1584) 
 
-0.3201 (0.2161) 
Dependent variable is Efficiency (Eq. 8) 
Revenue Diversification (𝛾1) -0.0866* (0.0488) 
 
-0.1689*** (0.0504) 
 
-0.1902*** (0.0684) 
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Risk (𝛾2) 0.2836*** (0.1053) 
 
0.1211*** (0.0072) 
 
0.3621*** (0.1079) 
Capital (𝛾3) -1.3564*** (0.5075) 
 
-1.1059*** (0.2315) 
 
-0.6903 (0.7709) 
Size (𝛾4) -0.0152 (0.0101) 
 
-0.0116* (0.0066) 
 
0.0163 (0.0172) 
GDP growth (𝛾5) 0.0006 (0.0048) 
 
0.0032 (0.0051) 
 
0.0126* (0.0072) 
Constant 0.1605 (0.3316) 
 
1.1423*** (0.0835) 
 
-0.4593 (0.3506) 
Number of observations 356 
  
356 
  
356 
 
Chi-squared for Eq. 6 64.8329*** 
  
384.0944*** 
  
55.8787*** 
 
Chi-squared for Eq. 7 184.7777*** 
  
95.9610*** 
  
152.4617*** 
 Chi-squared for Eq. 8 20.6992***     295.8959***     51.8796***   
***, ** and *: 1%, 5% and 10% levels of significance, respectively 
Standard errors in parentheses 
         
We also test the moral hazard hypothesis in the poorly capitalized banks by re-estimating the 
system of three equations (Equations 6-8) for the subsample of banks with the capital ratio 
below the sample median. Results for Equation 6 are displayed in Table 5. It is apparent from 
Column 1 of Table 5 that capital ratio (𝛼3) has a significant and positive effect on Z-score. 
That is a decrease in capital ratio temporarily preceding a growth in insolvency risk, 
confirming the “moral hazard” hypothesis in Vietnamese banks. Revenue diversification (𝛼1) 
is also found to be unrelated to insolvency risk in thinly capitalized banks. Cost efficiency 
(𝛼2) is also found to be significantly and inversely linked to insolvency risk in thinly 
capitalized banks, providing evidence of the existence of “bad management” in these banks.  
 
Table 5: Test for moral hazard hypothesis for the subsample of poorly capitalised banks 
 
Risk measurement Risk = Z-score   Risk = minus ROE Volatility   Risk = Z-score 
Efficiency estimation technique SFA efficiency 
 
SFA efficiency 
 
DEA efficiency 
Column (1)   (2)   (3) 
Dependent variable is Risk 
        Revenue Diversification (𝛼1) -0.2098 (0.1695) 
 
-0.2806 (0.4512) 
 
0.1763 (0.1815) 
Efficiency (𝛼2) 2.1666*** (0.1191) 
 
9.5037*** (2.0084) 
 
1.8263*** (0.2059) 
Capital (𝛼3) 7.9226*** (0.1586) 
 
28.4833*** (3.2087) 
 
7.1437*** (0.2158) 
Size (𝛼4) 0.0246** (0.0113) 
 
-0.0353 (0.0334) 
 
-0.0298** (0.0133) 
GDP growth (𝛼5) 0.0281* (0.0165) 
 
0.0669 (0.0458) 
 
-0.0007 (0.0172) 
Constant 0.6322*** (0.1966) 
 
-10.7888*** (2.0643) 
 
1.5073*** (0.2191) 
Number of observations 178 
 
178 
 
178 
Chi-squared for Eq.5 4482.9817***   104.0855***   1403.2879*** 
***, ** and *: 1%, 5% and 10% levels of significance, respectively 
Standard errors in parentheses 
Poorly capitalised banks are banks with the capital ratio below the median 
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Robustness check on the research hypotheses 
To check for robustness on confirmed hypotheses on diversification and managerial 
behaviour, this study re-estimates the system of three equations for the samples of all banks 
and low capitalized banks by using either alternative risk measure (volatility of ROE), or an 
alternative efficiency estimation technique (DEA). The results for the sample of all banks are 
displayed in Columns 2-3 of Table 4 and those for the subsample of poorly capitalised banks 
are presented in Columns 2-3 of Table 5. Note that greater Z-score indicates lower risk level 
while greater volatility of ROE shows higher risk level. Therefore, for ease of comparing, we 
use the opposite of the volatility of ROE when estimating the managerial model. 
 
The support for “monitoring” hypothesis, “bad management” hypothesis, “bad luck” 
hypothesis and “moral hazard” hypothesis for the sample of all Vietnamese local commercial 
banks remain robust to risk measurement (the opposite of ROE volatility) (Column 2 of Table 
4) and efficiency estimation technique (DEA) (Columns 3 of Table 4). However, revenue 
diversification is found to be unrelated to insolvency risk and capital ratio when risk is 
measured by Z-score and efficiency is estimated using SFA technique, while banks with 
greater revenue diversification are found to have lower insolvency risk and lower capital ratio 
when risk is measured by the opposite of ROE volatility or efficiency is estimated using DEA 
technique. Moreover, the findings on the existence of “moral hazard” and “bad management” 
behaviours and insignificant impact of revenue diversification on insolvency risk for the 
sample of poorly capitalised banks are robust to risk measurement (Column 2 of Table 5) and 
efficiency estimation technique (Column 3 of Table 5). In addition, the confirmed hypotheses 
on diversification and managerial behaviour also remain robust to SFA efficiency estimation 
approach (SFA model developed by Greene (2005)) except the “monitoring” hypothesis 
when risk is measured by Z-score (see Tables C.2-C.3 in Appendix C).  
 
6. Conclusions and policy implications 
To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the only study looking at three important issues 
of Vietnamese banks. The first is the cost efficiency and its components (technological 
progress and scale economy) of 28 Vietnamese domestic commercial banks over the period 
1995-2011. The second is documenting evidence of the benefits of revenue diversification 
from its impacts on bank risk, efficiency and capital. The last is identifying the management 
behaviour of Vietnamese banks from the interrelationships between risk, capital and 
efficiency.  
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Using SFA for estimating efficiency, this study finds that cost efficiency experienced a 
slightly upward trend over the analysis period. Technological changes overall reduces the 
costs of Vietnamese banks by 0.5% per year, while scale expansion raises their costs. Using 
3SLS for estimating the managerial behaviour model, which is a system of three equations 
with cost efficiency, insolvency risk and capital ratio being dependent variables, this study 
finds that revenue diversification has no significant impact on insolvency risk and capital 
ratio, but decreases cost efficiency of Vietnamese banks, supporting the “monitoring” 
hypothesis. This study also finds that a decline in cost efficiency leads to a rise in cost 
efficiency, implying “bad management” behaviour; an increase in risk resulted in a reduction 
in cost efficiency, indicating the “bad luck” behaviour; and a reduction in capital ratio in the 
poorly capitalized banks led to a growth in risk, suggesting the “moral hazard” behaviour. 
The results on the confirmed hypotheses are robust to a set of sensitivity analyses involving: 
(i) alternative risk measure (volatility of ROE); ii) alternative efficiency estimation technique 
(DEA), and, iii) alternative SFA cost function approach (SFA model proposed by Greene 
(2005)). 
 
The findings of our study provide important insights into the banking system of a rapidly 
developing economy, and have some practical implications for policy makers and bank 
managers. Firstly, the evidence of scale diseconomy suggests that Vietnamese banks should 
be discouraged from size expansion. Secondly, the evidence of bad management behaviour 
implies that regulators and supervisors could use operating efficiency as a good predictor of 
risky banks. The evidence of bad luck also suggests that the policy makers should pay more 
attention to supervisory standards for controlling the risks caused by exogenous shocks. The 
evidence of moral hazard implies that bank regulators and supervisors should enact 
supervising standards following the Basel II regulatory framework. Especially, they should 
carefully monitor capital ratio in the poorly capitalized banks in order to require them to 
quickly raise capital when it declines. Thirdly, the strategy relating to revenue diversification 
requires further examination on the profit profile since the revenue advantages from this 
diversification may outweigh the cost disadvantages. However, if Vietnamese banks target an 
improvement of cost efficiency, they should continue to operate on the traditional credit lines 
rather than exploiting new non-traditional product opportunities. 
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Appendix A: DEA cost efficiency model 
We assume that we have n banks (i =1,…, n) that use a vector of m inputs 𝑥𝑖 = (𝑥𝑖1, … , 𝑥𝑖𝑚) 
for which they pay prices 𝑐𝑖 = (𝑐𝑖1, … , 𝑐𝑖𝑚) to produce a vector of s outputs 𝑦𝑖 =
(𝑦𝑖1, … , 𝑦𝑖𝑠) which are sold at price 𝑟𝑖 = (𝑟𝑖1, … , 𝑟𝑖𝑠). The widely-used cost efficiency model 
for estimating the cost efficiency of bank j can be expressed in linear programming as 
follows: 
   𝑀𝑖𝑛 ∑ 𝑐𝑗𝑚
𝑚
𝑥𝑗𝑚                                                 
Subject to 
 𝑥𝑗𝑚 ≥  ∑ 𝑥𝑖𝑚
𝑖
𝜆𝑖        ⩝ 𝑚 
𝑦𝑗𝑠 ≤ ∑ 𝑦𝑖𝑠
𝑖
𝜆𝑖          ⩝ 𝑠 
∑ 𝜆𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
= 1 
 𝜆 ≥ 0 
The solution to this model is the optimal input demand vector 𝑥𝑗
∗ = (𝑥𝑗1
∗ … … , 𝑥𝑗𝑚
∗ ) in the 
production possibility, which minimizes costs with the given input prices c, and is obtained 
from a linear combination of banks that produces outputs at minimum level yjs, using the 
same or less amount of input. This hypothetical bank then would have an optimal cost 𝐶𝑗
∗ =
 ∑ 𝑐𝑗𝑚𝑥𝑗𝑚
∗
𝑚  which, by definition, would be less than or equal to that of bank j (𝐶𝑗 =
 ∑ 𝑐𝑗𝑚𝑥𝑗𝑚𝑚 ). The cost efficiency of bank j (CEj) is defined as follows: 
𝐶𝐸𝑗 =  
𝐶𝑗
∗
𝐶𝑗
=  
∑ 𝑐𝑗𝑚𝑚 𝑥𝑗𝑚
∗
∑ 𝑐𝑗𝑚𝑥𝑗𝑚𝑚
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Appendix B: List of sample banks 
Bank Number Bank Name Bank Type 
1 An Binh Commercial JSB 
2 Asia Commercial Bank JSB 
3 Bank for Investment and Development of Vietnam SOB 
4 DongA Commercial Joint Stock Bank JSB 
5 Hanoi Building Commercial Joint Stock Bank JSB 
6 Housing Bank of Mekong Delta SOB 
7 Housing Development Commercial Joint Stock Bank JSB 
8 Joint Stock Commercial Bank For Foreign Trade Of Vietnam SOB 
9 Military Commercial Joint Stock Bank JSB 
10 Nam A Commercial Joint Stock Bank JSB 
11 Nam Viet Commercial Joint Stock Bank JSB 
12 Ngan Hang Hang Hai (Vietnam Maritime Commercial Stock Bank) JSB 
13 Ocean Commercial Joint Stock Bank JSB 
14 Orient Commercial Joint Stock Bank JSB 
15 Petrolimex Group Commercial Joint Stock Bank JSB 
16 Saigon Bank for Industry and Trade JSB 
17 Saigon Commercial Joint Stock Bank JSB 
18 Saigon Hanoi Commercial Joint Stock Bank JSB 
19 Saigon Thuong Tin Commercial Joint Stock Bank JSB 
20 Southeast Asia Commercial JSB JSB 
21 Southern Commercial Joint Stock Bank JSB 
22 Vietnam Asia Commercial Joint-Stock Bank JSB 
23 Vietnam Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development SOB 
24 Vietnam Export-Import Commercial Joint Stock Bank JSB 
25 Vietnam International Bank JSB 
26 Vietnam Joint-Stock Commercial Bank for Industry and Trade SOB 
27 Vietnam Prosperity Joint Stock Commercial Bank JSB 
28 Vietnam Technological and Commercial Joint-Stock Bank JSB 
JSB: joint-stock commercial bank 
 SOB: state-owned bank 
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Appendix C: Robust results when efficiency is estimated by SFA model developed by 
Greene (2005) 
 
Table C.1: Cost function (SFA estimates) 
Variables 
  Cost function 
  Coef. Std. Err. 
Log of net loan  (lny1) 
 0.5550*** (0.0676) 
Log of other earning asset (lny2) 
 0.4201*** (0.0550) 
Log of price ratio of financial capital/ labour (lnw1/w3) 
 0.3358*** (0.1012) 
Log of price ratio of physical capital /labour (lnw2/w3) 
 0.0542 (0.0708) 
Time trend (t) 
 -0.0101 (0.0117) 
(lny1)2 
 0.1667*** (0.0196) 
lny1*lny2 
 -0.1702*** (0.0119) 
lny1*lnw1/w3 
 -0.0083 (0.0196) 
lny1*lnw2/w3 
 -0.0007 (0.0119) 
lny1*t 
 0.0021 (0.0024) 
(lny2)2 
 0.1524*** (0.0088) 
lny2*lnw1/w3 
 0.0453** (0.0178) 
lny2*lnw2/w3 
 0.0035 (0.0095) 
lny2*t 
 0.0013 (0.0023) 
(lnw1/w3)2 
 0.2850*** (0.0332) 
lnw1/w3*lnw2/w3  -0.0943*** (0.0230) 
lnw1/w3*t 
 0.0061* (0.0032) 
(lnw2/w3)2 
 0.0386** (0.0159) 
lnw2/w3*t 
 0.0004 (0.0022) 
t2 
 -0.0026*** (0.0006) 
σu 
 1.1604*** (0.4972) 
γ (σu/ σv)   23.9124*** (0.4974) 
***, ** and *: 1%, 5% and 10% levels of significance, respectively 
 
Standard errors in parentheses 
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Figure C.3: Cost elasticity with respect to output variables (CESY)
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Table C.2: Tests for hypotheses on diversification and managerial behaviour 
Risk measurement Risk = Z-score   Risk = minus ROE Volatility   Risk = Z-score 
Efficiency estimation technique SFA efficiency 
 
SFA efficiency 
 
DEA efficiency 
Column (1)   (2)   (3) 
Dependent variable is Risk 
Revenue Diversification 0.1074 (0.1722) 
 
1.3451*** (0.4725) 
 
0.3749* (0.2007) 
Efficiency 2.4666*** (0.8219) 
 
9.4985*** (0.9188) 
 
2.0295*** (0.5344) 
Capital 4.7876*** (0.9106) 
 
10.9072*** (2.0383) 
 
3.2670** (1.3089) 
Size 0.0579** (0.0249) 
 
0.1331** (0.0614) 
 
0.0003 (0.0378) 
GDP growth 0.0008 (0.0160) 
 
-0.0318 (0.0477) 
 
-0.0186 (0.0182) 
Constant 0.3895 (0.8184) 
 
-10.9766*** (1.0280) 
 
1.4149*** (0.4996) 
Dependent variable is Capital 
Revenue Diversification -0.0261 (0.0356) 
 
-0.1211*** (0.0468) 
 
-0.0284 (0.0564) 
Efficiency -0.5425*** (0.1558) 
 
-0.8481*** (0.2029) 
 
-0.1806 (0.2264) 
Risk 0.2050*** (0.0378) 
 
0.0895*** (0.0159) 
 
0.1924** (0.0759) 
Size -0.0122*** (0.0030) 
 
-0.0125*** (0.0038) 
 
-0.0126* (0.0071) 
GDP growth -0.0001 (0.0032) 
 
0.0027 (0.0045) 
 
-0.0010 (0.0045) 
Constant -0.0421 (0.2025) 
 
0.9881*** (0.1726) 
 
-0.3201 (0.2161) 
Dependent variable is Efficiency 
Revenue Diversification -0.0610 (0.0522) 
 
-0.1413*** (0.0501) 
 
-0.1902*** (0.0684) 
Risk 0.2839** (0.1105) 
 
0.1050*** (0.0096) 
 
0.3621*** (0.1079) 
Capital -1.4239*** (0.5110) 
 
-1.1391*** (0.2697) 
 
-0.6903 (0.7709) 
Size -0.0166 (0.0102) 
 
-0.0138* (0.0073) 
 
0.0163 (0.0172) 
GDP growth 0.0011 (0.0051) 
 
0.0034 (0.0051) 
 
0.0126* (0.0072) 
Constant 0.1695 (0.3514) 
 
1.1529*** (0.0932) 
 
-0.4593 (0.3506) 
Number of observations 356 
  
356 
  
356 
 Chi-squared for Eq.5 57.7859 
  
165.3000 
  
55.8787 
 Chi-squared for Eq.6 177.1347 
  
102.6152 
  
152.4617 
 Chi-squared for Eq.7 16.5847     127.5729     51.8796   
***, ** and *: 1%, 5% and 10% levels of significance, respectively 
   Standard errors in parentheses 
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Table C.3: Test for moral hazard hypothesis for the subsample of poorly capitalised banks 
Risk measurement Risk = Z-score   Risk = minus ROE Volatility   Risk = Z-score 
Efficiency estimation technique SFA efficiency 
 
SFA efficiency 
 
DEA efficiency 
Column (1)   (2)   (3) 
Dependent variable is Risk 
        Revenue Diversification -0.2418 (0.2076) 
 
-0.2185 (0.4276) 
 
0.1763 (0.1815) 
Efficiency 3.2168*** (0.3167) 
 
7.0813** (3.2766) 
 
1.8263*** (0.2059) 
Equity to Total Assets 10.1021*** (0.4695) 
 
25.1297*** (5.2726) 
 
7.1437*** (0.2158) 
Ln(Total Assets) 0.0311** (0.0139) 
 
-0.0423 (0.0338) 
 
-0.0298** (0.0133) 
GDP growth 0.0300 (0.0202) 
 
0.0292 (0.0447) 
 
-0.0007 (0.0172) 
Constant -0.5195 (0.3829) 
 
-8.0972** (3.4267) 
 
1.5073*** (0.2191) 
Number of observations 178 
  
178 
  
178 
 Chi-squared for Eq.5 1859.1180     57.1875     1403.2879   
***, ** and *: 1%, 5% and 10% levels of significance, respectively 
Standard errors in parentheses 
        Poorly capitalised banks are banks with the capital ratio below the median 
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